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ABSTRACT 
This article draws on recent experience in the Asia-Pacific region to examine some 
conditions that are needed for administrative reforms to take hold, some lessons, and two 
approaches to reform. It then gives a brief overview of some key reform priorities, with 
examples from the region. A typology is drawn from a framework recently developed by 
the Asian Development Bank (Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram, 2001: 729-776). Although 
experience with reform has improved our understanding of what works, more in depth 
research is needed on how to achieve high performance in the public sector.  
BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 1995, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) started to pay serious attention 
to governance issues. Building on a notion that sound, development management is 
needed for effective development performance, the ADB became the first International 
Finance Institution (IFI) to adopt a Board-approved, governance policy (ADB, 1995). 
This work was carried out in close coordination with the World Bank, which 
subsequently issued a similar commitment at the highest level.2 To support this emerging 
consensus, Transparency International was launched in 1993 by a former World Bank 
staff to mobilize pressure from civil society on the governance agenda.   
ADB has since broadened its definition of good governance to include a cluster of 
policies and strategies, including procurement, law and policy reform, participation of 
civil society, gender, anticorruption, and money laundering. This cluster helps member 
countries adopt institutional and policy reforms to adapt to an increasingly competitive 
regional and global economy by building sound macroeconomic and legal frameworks 
that strengthen markets and individual choice, and in turn economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Although internationally accepted tools, concepts and notions of good practice 
broadly influence the goals and strategies of reforms,3 there are significant differences 
among Asian countries in how they choose to implement their reforms. 
The ADB defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's social and economic resources for development." Within 
ADBs governance policy, support to public administration reform is a key component: 
Civil service reform is perhaps the most elusive transformation facing a 
governmentA professional and accountable civil service that can administer rules, 
maintain standards and competition, and respect property rights is critical for private 
sector confidence in the governments efforts at economic reform. What is needed, 
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therefore, is to move progressively towards public administration systems that 
provide clear career paths, adequate compensation and benefits, and incentives that tie 
advancement in the civil service more closely to staff performance and productivity. 
While downsizing operations should facilitate such improvements, (they) will not by 
(themselves) obviate the requirement for more sophisticated management and control 
systems (ADB, 1995: 31-33).  
By contributing to sound governance, public administration reform also contributes to 
reducing poverty because it 
(i) supports participatory, pro-poor policies and sound macroeconomic management; 
(ii) ensures adequacy, predictability, transparency and accountability in use of public 
funds for pro-poor budget priorities, (iii) encourages private sector initiatives, (iv) 
promotes effective delivery of public services by a capable, motivated civil service,  
(v) disseminates basic performance data and provides client feedback to monitor 
service delivery, and (vi) helps establish and maintain the rule of law (ADB, 2003: 2). 
Although ADB and other IFIs use terms such as participation, transparency, 
accountability and rule of law in describing their governance support, they dont 
explicitly promote democratic political processes as is done by other development 
agencies.  Article 36 of the ADBs Charter states that the ADB shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
political character of the member concerned.  Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions. Similar restrictions in other IFI charters also apply. 
However, this has proved less of a hindrance to supporting good governance than might 
be expected. One reason is that UN and bilateral development agencies have been active 
in promoting democratic political processes, based on their different mandates and 
comparative advantage. A second reason, particularly evident in the Asia region, is that 
some countries have achieved economic growth and poverty reduction with less attention 
to democratic freedoms than has been the case elsewhere. Recent surveys (PERC, 2004) 
show, for example, that Peoples Republic of China, Viet Nam, Malaysia and Singapore 
have higher competitiveness ratings than Philippines and Indonesia, despite lower 
rankings in civil liberties and political rights. 
With this conceptual foundation in mind, the following will draw from recent experience 
in the Asia-Pacific region to examine some conditions that are needed for administrative 
reforms to take hold, some lessons, and two approaches to reform. It will then give a brief 
overview of some key reform priorities, with examples from the region. This typology is 
drawn from a framework recently developed by the ADB (Schiavo-Campo and 
Sundaram, 2001: 729-776). Although experience with reform has improved our 
understanding of what works, more in depth research is needed on how to achieve high 
performance in the public sector.  
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CONDITIONS NEEDED FOR REFORMS TO TAKE HOLD 
There are five conditions that are generally met when public administration reforms start 
to take hold: (i) leadership; (ii) vision; (iii) selectivity; (iv) sensitivity; and (v) stamina.  
Leadership 
Barzelay (2004: 263-66) points out that heads of state and other top officials have a 
crucial role in putting reforms on the policy agenda, and in determining how important 
reforms are relative to other priorities, with the decisive factors being maximizing 
political advantage, and minimizing political risk.   For many leaders, the politically 
opportune time for launching reforms is shortly after forming a government.  
For example, in Vanuatu, inheriting fiscal uncertainties and a weak governance  
structure, the government that assumed office in October 1996 introduced the 
Comprehensive Reform Program. This was a broad initiative to reform the public service 
sector and public enterprises, and improve the enabling environment for private sector 
development. A participative and consultative process was adopted from the very 
beginning, which included extensive media coverage, and convening annual summits to 
provide citizens an opportunity to monitor progress in the implementation of reforms. 
However, a weakness of the program is that there aren't enough senior lawyers, 
engineers, accountants and capable managers. As a result, service delivery has not 
improved, and may have gotten worse in some sectors such as in agriculture. (ADB, 1999 
and 2002d).    
In Pakistan, the new Government taking power in 1999 launched a process of 
decentralization reforms to: "(i) break the political and administrative hold of traditional 
elites, (ii) pass effective political and fiscal power from the federal and provincial levels 
to newly empowered local governments, and (iii) make local governments accountable to 
the 
Public (ADB 2000: 1). The reforms were formally instituted following the conclusion of 
local government elections in 2001. Among the reasons for slower than expected 
implementation since then has been the challenge of ownership. Although the reforms 
have the full support of the Head of State and the powerful National Reconstruction 
Board, they were not initially fully supported by key officials at the provincial levels. 
Since then, extensive consultation has taken place with the concerned officials, and as a 
result implementation progress is improving.  
In the case of Viet Nams, a reform-minded Prime Minister appointed in 1997 was 
initially responding to demands from war veterans (who carried out unprecedented 
protests against corrupt local officials, punitive tax demands, et al in two provinces in 
1997), some Party elites, investors, and donors for cleaner, more effective 
implementation of Party policy to better regulate a fast growing economy. To ensure 
effective coordination in designing a reform program, the Viet Nam National Public 
Administrative Reform (PAR) Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, was constituted 
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in 1998. It included two former Deputy Prime Ministers, Nguyen Khanh, who effectively 
chaired meetings, and Nguyen Tan Dung responsible for financial reform. Other 
members were ministers responsible for the Government Committee on Personnel, the 
Office of the Government and the Ministry of Justice (ADB, 2001).   
Although authentic national leadership and ownership are crucial to reform success, one 
must be careful in aid dependent economies not to confuse it with merely placating 
donors, as described by Hirschmann (2003: 240): 
Recipients have long ago learned what donors want, and they now seem to want two 
things: that you do what they want but convey the idea as your ownIt has become 
more difficult to disentangle donor and recipient ownershipLife is made a lot easier 
when you do what donors want. 
Donors can play a supportive role, but successful reforming leaders generally have more 
important, domestic political reasons for reform. 
Vision 
Comprehensive reforms that take hold are founded on a coherent vision of goals, broad 
objectives, and notional timetables for bringing about improved public administration. 
For example, Viet Nams PAR Program approved by the Prime Minister in 2002 outlines 
a workplan for the period 2001-2010, and it proposes to reform the entire public 
administration system by the end of that period. This is in line with Viet Nams 
overriding goal to accelerate the transition from a centrally planned to a socialist oriented 
market economy, with a state governed by the rule of law. 
The Programs agenda is broad. It includes replacing cumbersome administrative 
procedures with more simplified and transparent ones; reducing red tape and corruption; 
better defining the mandates and functions of institutions; reducing, during the period up 
to 2010, the number of ministries and consolidating within these the number of agencies; 
reforming provincial and other sub national administrations and redefining their relations 
with one another and the center; streamlining and rightsizing the organizational structures 
of ministries and other government agencies; reforming and rationalizing the relationship 
between ministries and other administrative bodies, and service delivery organizations 
and enterprises; raising the quality, standards and skills of civil servants and other public 
sector workers; undertaking salary reform for public employees; reforming public 
financial management; and modernizing the public administrative system, notably 
through computerization and the introduction of e-government (ADB 2003a). 
Selectivity 
Reforms take hold when they are important, and have a good potential to be carried out in 
a timely manner, and to be a catalyst for additional reforms. Selectivity means filling in 
the reform timetable in a pragmatic way, while supporting the long-term vision. It does 
not mean pushing ahead with ad hoc reforms, nor with isolated project implementation 
units (PIUs) or other privileged enclaves isolated from the mainstream. For example, the 
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state government of Andhra Pradesh, India has in recent years begun implementing its 
Vision 2020 reforms. One part of the reform agenda that has captured global attention 
has been a number of e-government initiatives. For example, about 214 land registration 
offices have been completely computerized since April 1998. Deeds are registered in one 
hour and other services like the issue of encumbrance certificates and valuation 
certificates in 15 minutes. As of February 2000, about 700,000 documents had been 
registered under CARD. Middlemen are no longer needed, and time consuming manual 
copying and indexing of documents, and storage in paper forms have all been replaced 
(Bhatnagar, 2000). There has also been some progress in the state in human resource 
management, and public enterprise reforms. However, politically sensitive reforms on 
reducing staffing, streamlining investment approvals, and reducing corruption have 
moved at a slower pace. For example, the government has only been able to get public 
employee union approval for e-government projects by promising that no jobs would be 
lost (Beschell, 2003: 245-249).  
Sensitivity 
Each country has its own unique historical, political, and cultural context that needs to be 
factored in. For example, Cambodia has experienced frequent changes in its political and 
economic regimes, which have been somewhat influenced by regional (e.g., Viet Nam) 
and non-regional countries (e.g., France). The evolutionary process of the legal system 
includes a French-based civil code and judiciary before 1953; a Vietnamese communist 
model from 1979-1989; and now back to the French-based civil code combined with 
common law in certain sectors.  The economic system, similarly, changed from a colonial 
system, to market-based, to Soviet-style central planning; and now back to a market-
based economy (ADB and Cambodia Development Resources Institute, 2000). In 
addition to the plethora of economic and administrative models, there are post-conflict 
issues including reconciliation, rebuilding institutions, skills and trust, and demobilizing 
combatants. The Royal Government of Cambodias Governance Action Plan has been 
designed with this complex array of issues in mind.  
Stamina 
Any fundamental reform takes time to take hold, and needs to be sustained across 
changes in governments and changes in donor funding. Because of the range of 
administrative problems, and the economic and political urgency of solving them, 
governments need a comprehensive vision and timetable for reform.  However, because 
of the enormity and political sensitivity of the task, and the severe limitations on capacity 
to manage reform, such a framework may take ten to twenty years to achieve significant 
impact.  Take the case of ICT reforms in Viet Nam. The story begins at least as far back 
as 1993, when a National Information Technology Program was initiated. The new Prime 
Minister appointed in 1997 continued implementing the program, including a government 
information network, and considerable application development, training and awareness 
raising. Next, the Prime Minister approved the PAR Master Program mentioned above 
with 7 action programs, one on modernizing state administration with a major role for e-
government. Next, the Government made a landmark policy decision in September 2001 
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for State Administrative Management Computerization (SAMCom), which was a far 
more comprehensive strategy than the earlier 1993 program. Based on this, the Prime 
Minister requested ADB support through the policy loan for support to PAR action 
program 4 (training) and program 7(e-government). In addition to the loan approved in 
2003, two additional ADB loans are provisionally planned to ensure successful 
implementation through 2010. 
The slow progress of administrative reform in the Russian Federation also shows the need 
for stamina. In 1989, a group drafted a civil service law that was not adopted. Spurred on 
by the dramatic political changes of 1991, some modestly effective laws and regulations 
were enacted, and progress made on modernizing human resource management and 
training.  In 1996, work began on designing more significant reforms toward a merit-
based, efficient, effective, corruption-free public sector, based on surveys and analysis by 
a number of expert working groups. Although a comprehensive design was presented to 
the new Prime Minister in 1997, and summarized in President Yeltsins Annual Message 
to the National Assembly of 1998, the detailed design was never published nor 
implemented. However, the initial effort did help to raise awareness among some senior 
officials of the need for reforms, and thus helped pave the way for a recent wave of 
reform launched by President Putin in 2002. The new reforms are reinforced by extensive 
diagnostic and comparative analytical work, initially led by the Center for Strategic 
Studies, including a functional review of 5,600 functions of 60 federal agencies. 
Achievements include launch of significant pay reform for senior-level civil servants, 
enactment of a Code of Conduct for civil servants and other relevant decrees, laws and 
regulations, and launching of pilots projects in ministries and regions on pay reform and 
performance budgeting, with support from the World Bank (2002, 2004) and other 
donors.  
BROAD LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 
Improving public administration is one of the most difficult challenges facing 
governments and their development partners, because of the complexity of the processes, 
the wide variation in context, and the difficulties in measuring reform outputs and 
outcomes. Still, there are four broad lessons to consider: (i) Begin with diagnostic work; 
(ii) Test for readiness; (iii) Move at the right speed; and (iv) Implement effectively. 
Begin with diagnostic work 
Broad diagnostic work can be useful as a first step. Governments, development agencies, 
and other stakeholders are often not fully aware of the administrative challenges faced.  
For example, ADB carries out Country Governance Assessments (CGAs) to 
systematically assess the quality of governance for borrowers, and to strengthen the 
linkage between the quality of governance and levels and composition of assistance. 
ADB has completed CGAs in six countries, and they are underway in an additional 
twenty-two (ADB, 2003e). Results of CGAs have been incorporated or are being 
incorporated into Country Strategy and Programs, and Poverty Partnership Agreements. 
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Internal reviews of CGAs have found that there needs to be better linking of governance 
support and poverty reduction. CGAs often highlight the absorptive capacity of the 
country to pursue market-oriented reforms and utilize external assistance as a reoccurring 
governance challenge.  Within strategic sectors of the countrys economy, such as 
agriculture and transportation, governance was repeatedly discussed as an underlying 
issue essential to the sectors overall development and performance.  Other development 
partners such as the World Bank (Kaufmann, 2004), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the UK Department for International Development 
also support governance diagnostic work in the region, along with private consultancies 
such as Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.  
In addition, political assessment tools can help stakeholders better understand the array of 
interests lining up for and against specific reforms, and the opportunities for mobilizing 
decisive coalitions of interests to speed up reform (Nunberg et al, 1994; Reich et al, 1995; 
Gillespie et al, 1996). One analyst suggests focusing on "where does the shoe pinch", or 
what aspects of governance offend government stakeholders and clients, how durable is the 
support for change, how much division is there among stakeholders, and what are the 
lessons of similar attempts to change in the past.  (Montgomery, 1996: 959)  
Test for readiness 
Even when conditions may not be right for fundamental reforms, governments may be 
willing to carry out detailed surveys, functional reviews, and non-sensitive improvements 
in areas such as information systems. These pilot initiatives can test the readiness of the 
government and society for more fundamental reforms, and help to increase the demand 
for reform from a range of stakeholders. For example, in Nepal the Ministry of General 
Administration (MOGA), with support from ADB, has put civil service personnel records 
on line linked to approved positions, and is in the process of linking this system to 
payroll. In addition, some vacant positions have been eliminated, the creation of new civil 
service posts frozen, and agreement reached to stop new recruitment in vacant posts in 
lower positions constituting about 33 percent of total civil service positions. The 
Government has also approved a contracting out directive which will allow 
subcontracting of certain positions and functions to the private sector  (ADB 2003c: 3). 
These initial reforms may help to build up support for deeper reforms in the future. 
Move at the right speed 
Some stress the need for a "top down", politically-driven, all-encompassing reform 
process to address such problems.  Thus Werlin (1992: 204), citing the example of 
countries such as Korea, argues that reforming central bureaucracies is primarily a 
problem of political will and government capacity to effectively use persuasive and 
manipulative (rather than coercive and corrupting) forms of power.     
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Esman (1991:138-139), on the other hand, advocates a "bottom up" approach. He claims 
that system-wide reforms disrupt familiar routines and threaten established centers of 
powers without demonstrating convincingly their effectiveness.  He prescribes, instead, 
incremental, confidence-building measures, such as training, new technologies (e.g., e-
government), introduced with staff participation and focused at the level of individual 
programs or organizations. Brautigam (1996) makes a related argument that reforms 
should concentrate on a few critical functions, shifting politically important patronage 
opportunities to less vital agencies. 
Both viewpoints are correct, assuming that in either case a coherent vision is being 
broadly followed. Reforms need to move as fast as possible when circumstances 
permit, and as slow as necessary when accountability needs to catch up, absorptive 
capacity to grow, or public tolerance to be rebuilt (Schiavo-Campo et al, 2001:733). 
Implementation may need to proceed in many small stages.  Some of these can be 
planned, and scheduled based on priorities and complementarities.  Others will proceed 
based on targets of opportunity.   
ADBs policy based lending to the Kyrgyz Republic in corporate governance and 
enterprise reform points out the risks of trying to move too fast in the regulatory area. 
Although regulatory changes were needed to improve performance of key, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), there was only limited success in implementing the changes because 
of corruption and weak governance in public administration, the financial sector, and the 
judiciary. Targeted support to address selected aspects of these problems might have 
helped to build the foundation for broader, more successful SOE reforms at a later stage 
(ADB, 2003i). 
Implement effectively 
Outputs at the early stages of reform may include vision statements, strategies, action 
plans, frameworks, sector-wide adjustment programs, commitments agreed on at 
international meetings, reorganizations, and new laws and procedures. However, these 
are of little value if not properly resourced and implemented. Both development agencies 
and governments sometimes take such outputs as indications that a challenge has been 
solved, rather than as a step along the way (Easterly, 2002: 20). For example, Philippine 
leaders periodically boast of their strong stance against corruption, citing the seven laws 
and 13 anti-corruption agencies instituted to fight graft since the 1950s. Yet because of 
the overlapping mandates and accountabilities of these agencies, low salaries for public 
officials, red tape, inconsistent policing, nepotism and lack of political will, these laws, 
institutions, and related action plans have not been effective (Quah, 2003: 93-101). 
APPROACHES TO REFORM 
Building on the conditions and lessons outlined above, there are two operational 
approaches that have been successful in some countries: (i) Assessing and strengthening 
capacity, including inter-agency linkages; and (ii) empowering agents of change. 
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Assessing and strengthening capacity, including inter-agency linkages4 
Many capabilities are needed for effective public administration, and to design and 
implement reforms, and capacity assessments are key components of the diagnostic work 
needed. Competitive pay and incentives are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
building capacity to effectively perform critical tasks.  Improving the performance of a 
task needs to begin with mapping the organizations involved in performing it. 
(Hilderbrand and Grindle, 1995: 441-464)  The organizational map is the picture of the 
task network: the organizations with primary responsibility for carrying out the task, 
those that are less central but still play a role, and those that provide various kinds of 
support to the performance of the task.  The description of interactions between these 
organizations is important, as is analysis of whether the interactions among the 
institutions are effective or are an area of capacity weakness.  Questions of relationships 
and coordination among organizations are important here.  All the dimensions of capacity 
need to be viewed from the perspective of the performance of the task. 
The second step involves looking outward from the task network. What contextual factors 
play a significant role regarding the capacity to perform these tasks, and how do they 
affect how--and how well--the tasks are performed?  At the level just above the task 
network, the impact of the institutions of the public sector needs to be considered, along 
with the broader economic, political and social environment.  
The third step focuses on each organization and its human resources.  These are closely 
interwoven, with the human resources a principal component of an organizations 
capacity, but only as brought together, structured, and utilized by the organization.  A 
profile of the human resource dimension should focus on the recruitment, training and 
retention of skilled managerial, professional, and technical personnel.  What impact does 
the organizations human resource profile have on its ability to perform its assigned tasks 
and reach its goals? What are the human resource strengths and weaknesses? 
Whereas the human resource profile of an organization is very important, whether those 
skilled personnel are effectively utilized is frequently the key to an organizations level of 
capacity to perform its assigned tasks and reach its goals. This issue focuses analysis on 
the organizational level, where such factors as the structure of work and authority 
relations, appraisal and incentive systems, formal and informal behavioral norms, 
management practices, and leadership influence whether skilled personnel are willing or 
able to contribute fully to performing the task. 
In addition, there are other capacity issues.  Does the organization have adequate 
financial and physical resources to function effectively?  Is it organized to use those 
resources effectively and efficiently to reach its goals?  Is it able to interact with other 
organizations, clients, and other stakeholders? 
Capacity strengthening is most effective when it is designed based on a thorough 
assessment covering the above issues. Evaluations of ADB (1997: 8-10) and other donor 
agency support to capacity strengthening show that such assessments are often not carried 
out, and thus the support is less effective that desired. To address these concerns, ADB 
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supported an extensive capacity assessment in 2003 of elected commune councils in 
Cambodia, and key organizations they work with at national, provincial and commune 
levels, prior to making investments in capacity building. Elected commune councils have 
relatively little decision making power, and are subject to bureaucratic control from their 
governor, and from central ministries. Although citizen participation is minimal in 
commune affairs, survey results suggest that citizens have a favorable impression of their 
performance. Since commune council members are mainly elderly, conservative men 
with relatively low levels of education, most have limited capacity for absorbing training. 
However, commune clerks need enhanced skills to deal with complex programming 
requirements (ADB, 2003h: 57-60).  Training is also needed to support civil registration 
of 95% of Cambodias citizens not presently registered. This exercise requires close 
coordination with commune council chiefs, provincial and district staff, and the Office of 
Civil Registration and Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the Ministry of 
Interior.   
A separate assessment for DOLA outlined the following priority steps for building 
capacity: competitive staff incentives, clear strategic direction, new organizational 
structure aligned with this, and a professional human resource function. Without these, 
any training provided will mainly contribute to the personal development of staff, not to 
the achievement of organizational goals (ADB,2004b: 6-7). 
Empowering agents of change 
One element of capacity strengthening deserves special mention: for reforms to take hold, 
there need to be change agents strategically located in key functional areas to spread new 
ways of working throughout the public administration system. Such staff need to be 
carefully selected, provided good working facilities, flexible procedures and other 
incentives, good at teaching others on-the job, and at networking across organizations.  
Such agents of change and their organizational units are different from the project 
implementation units often set up by donor agencies. The latter are set up to be insulated 
from mainstream administrative systems, on the assumption that this is the best way to 
prevent corruption and ensure effective delivery of donor support. By contrast, agents of 
change emerge within existing structures, and work to change them from within, and to 
spread innovations across government.  
For example, the Royal Government of Cambodia began implementing Priority Mission 
Groups (PMGs) in 2003 as a means of motivating a group of initially 1,000 carefully 
selected officials to facilitate key reform initiatives while longer-term civil service 
reforms were taking hold. PMGs were meant to replace the previous practice of donor 
agencies topping up the salaries of counterpart officials working on their projects (ADB, 
2001a and World Bank and ADB, 2003: 93). 
In another type of example, the Hyderabad (India) Metropolitan Water Supply & 
Sewerage Board uses its Single Window Cell (SWC) to reduce corruption for new 
connections.  Previously, applications were made to one of 120 section offices, and then 
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forwarded to 14 other staff before approval, each requiring speed payments. Under the 
SWC, the application process is centralized in one, public place, with applications 
recorded on computers that are difficult for corrupt officials to alter. Staff is motivated to 
provide good service with distinctive uniforms, modern offices and individual computer 
terminals. The service improvement has been praised extensively in the media, which 
further improves staff motivation (Davis, 2004: 62-3). 
KEY REFORM PRIORITIES 
With these conditions, lessons and approaches in mind, one can now review some key 
reform priorities that have emerged in the region, and have a better basis for analyzing 
how to tackle them in a given country. This list is not complete, but gives an indication of 
some leading reform challenges in Asia-Pacific countries. 
Government Machinery and Organization 
Central government organization 
Governments need a structure at the center that ensures both coordination and 
accountability. When there are tradeoffs between the two, emphasis should be placed on 
assigning clear roles and accountabilities. For example, public administration reforms in 
Peoples Republic of China since the late 1980s have initially focused on align 
government structures and practices with the needs of a market economy. This has 
included corporatizing government departments producing goods for the market, and 
reducing the number of State Council ministries and commissions from 40 to 29 between 
1998-2001. New personnel practices have also reduced the average age and raised the 
educational level of cadres, and made the selection process more competitive. 
Downsizing efforts have not been as successful during this phase, with the number of 
public employees increasing by 16 percent from 1991-9 (ADB, 2003b: 33-40). By 
another measure, between 1980-96, administrative costs increased 14.6 times, while 
revenues increased by 5.5 times, thus giving an impetus for future reform (Straussman 
and Zhang, 2001:415). 
Central agencies are normally responsible for the regulatory framework covering inter 
alia banking, capital markets, utilities, environment, labor, and pensions. The central 
issue in most countries is not the quality of regulations, but weaknesses in 
implementation.  Take, for example, ADBs recent support to pension reform in 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Uzbekistan. Governments drew on this 
support in the hope that the growth of privately managed pension funds would spur the 
development of capital markets, and reduce the burden on publicly funded, pay-as-you-go 
systems. However, an evaluation found that vital preconditions were missing such as 
qualified regulators, an independent judiciary, capital markets too thin to give reasonable 
assurance of adequate returns, and fiscal constraints. Initial work should have focused in 
these areas (ADB, 2003j). 
Sub national government organization and decentralization5 
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Decentralization means transferring fiscal, political and administrative functions from 
higher to lower levels of government, and can take on different forms depending on the 
degree to which independence of action is assigned to lower levels of authority. 
Deconcentration involves central agencies assigning certain functions to lower-level 
branch offices, and is appropriate when the national government wants to retain control. 
Delegation takes place when authority for defined tasks is transferred from one public 
agency to another agency or service provider that is accountable to the former, but not 
wholly controlled by it, and is appropriate for certain, technical functions. Devolution 
takes place when authority for defined tasks is transferred from a public agency to 
autonomous, local-level units of elected leadership holding corporate status, granted, for 
example, under legislation6, and is appropriate for functions that are local in scope.  
Decentralization is not necessarily a spatial concept requiring reassignment of service 
delivery responsibilities from higher to lower orders of administration, though this often 
is the case. Cohen and Peterson (1999: 61) emphasize that it is rather the broadening of 
institutions producing and providing needed goods and services at efficient cost, where 
ever they are located and whether they are public, quasi-public or private. A related trend 
is that many governments are contracting out public services, which gives rise to debate 
about the consequences for efficiency, through competition, and accountability, through 
unclear, overlapping mandates (Milward and Prova).  
It is fallacious to presume decentralization indicates an inexorable policy progression 
from more to less centralized governance structures, but by conventional measures, 
decentralization is in its early stages of adoption in the region, despite common 
commitment in most countries to intensify it and the fact that various decentralizations 
are underway.  
A key issue in the region is ensuring that sub national units have sufficient skills and 
capacity to exercise essential functions. Weak capacity is not a reason keeping functions 
at the center that should be decentralized, although it can mean avoiding hasty 
decentralization until sufficient capacities are in place. For example, ADB is supporting 
district governments in Indonesia to raise their operational capability. Each participating 
district is preparing a capacity-building action plan, strengthening service providers to 
help implement the plan, and using information and communications technology to 
support coordination and management. Initial implementation was slow due to the 
uncertainty whether the project falls under the provision of Finance Minister decree no 
35/2003 on the channeling of international aid to the regions, which was issued in 
January 2003 one month after the loan was approved by ADB Board. After a six-month 
consultation between ADB, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, it was 
agreed that the project should be the responsibility of Central Government (Ministry of 
Home Affairs), not regional governments.  Article 112 of Law no 22 / 1999 stipulates that 
the empowerment of regional government under decentralization (such as capacity 
building) is the responsibility of central government.   
By mid-2004, it is expected that 14 district capacity building action plans (CB-AP) will 
be approved by their regional parliaments. Procurement of service providers to 
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implement the CB-APs will start immediately and 14 contracts are expected to be 
awarded at the fourth quarter of 2004. The formulation of CB-AP will be done through a 
participatory process involving media, civil society, and private sector. The project will 
also support a change the focus of Government personnel training from structural into 
technical and competency based training.7     
In Viet Nam, as part of the ADB-supported PAR program, processing and clearing 
procedures for ships using the Ho Chi Minh City Sea Port are now handled by one 
agency rather than six, and require only 9 rather than 36 documents, reducing clearance 
time from 6 hours per agency to only 30-60 minutes per ship. Likewise, in Quang Tri 
Province, the time for issuing land tenure certificates has been reduced from 91 to 23 
days for urban land and from 90 to 13 days for rural land (ADB, 2003f). A sample survey 
of citizens and officials in 20 districts and 40 communes reveals that there have been 
widespread benefits from simplification of administrative procedures through similar, 
one-stop, one-door models. Citizens benefit by spending less time waiting and 
travelling, and having better information provided to them. However, progress has been 
uneven; more prosperous jurisdictions have benefited more than poor ones, and poor and 
vulnerable groups, ethnic minorities and women benefit less than other groups. For 
example, even though more efficient local administrations can now deliver birth and land 
use right certificates, and other documents faster than before, poor people still cannot 
afford the charge (ADB 2003g).   
Managing public sector resources 
Central government 
Sound public expenditure management aims to control expenditures with available 
revenues, to allocate funds so that policies and programs are adequately funded, and to 
ensure efficient and effective implementation. Budgets should be comprehensive, and 
given adequate time for preparation, transparent consultation, and due process. Reliable 
revenue forecasts are crucial for ensuring budget realism. Adequate accounting and other 
systems should be in place to facilitate good budget execution and audit. 
ADB supports this process at both core and sector levels. For example, in Mongolia, 
ADB helped set up an outcome-based public expenditure management (PEM) system to 
provide the needed backbone for planned public administration reforms. The system: (i) 
links medium-term planning with annual budgeting; (ii) establishes credible hard budget 
constraints on aggregate and sectoral spending; and (iii) incorporates contingent liabilities 
as an integral part of the annual budget.  In PRC, ADB supported the formulation and 
adoption of auditing standards and procedures that conform to PRCs Audit Law and 
international auditing standards. Auditors from Chinas National Audit Office (CNAO) 
were trained in the application of audit standards through courses and study tours to 
various private audit firms and supreme audit institutions in the region. They also learned 
about risk-based audit methods, planning processes and evaluation of internal controls.  
The audit training programs developed will continue to be used to improve adherence by 
CNAO auditors to the revised government auditing standards and procedures. The 
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auditors also introduced measures to ensure continued compliance. These measures 
comprised establishing systems for accountability, quality review, and incentives. CNAO 
reported that, effective results could be seen and are drawing increasing public attention. 
An example at the sector level is ADB's support to Royal Government of Cambodia in 
managing its comprehensive sector wide education reform program.  To support a 
doubling of government spending over the period 2001/03, ADB provided technical 
support to ensure  improved spending effectiveness, including: a) systemic and targeted 
programs aimed at the poorest families and communes; b) targeted facilities development 
programs in underserved areas; c) new financial planning processes that directly link 
policy priorities to annual budget allocations and d) introduction of new accounting and 
audit procedures covering 15 programs across around 250 budget holding institutions and 
departments. As part of this process, procedures have been developed to underpin 
delegated spending authority to over 6,500 primary and secondary schools. An annual 
financial performance review process has been introduced in 2003 to identify future 
capacity building gaps and staff development programs (ADB, 2004a). 
Sub-national government 
The benefits of decentralization can only be achieved if local authorities have clear fiscal 
responsibilities, and the means to carry them out. Careful consideration is also needed of 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty and regional balance, and appropriate 
measures instituted as necessary to ensure adequate service standards across all 
jurisdictions. 
For example, following the election of over 126,000 new councilors in Pakistan in 2001, 
district governments are responsible for elementary and secondary education, and 
primary and secondary health. They can raise some additional revenues, while Provincial 
Finance Commissions authorize transfers from provincial funds. Improving access to 
justice has been a priority, with additional funding provided to subordinate courts and 
police services. Although these reforms are significant, there are still many remaining 
challenges, including cumbersome budget execution procedures and uneven provincial 
cash flow (Manning et al, 2003: 13). 
Since the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, intergovernmental transfers in 
the Philippines from central to local authorities have increased from about 3 percent to 18 
percent of the total government budget. Over 70,000 personnel were transferred from 
central to local agencies, including 60% of personnel of the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Health. Many services were transferred to local authorities, including agricultural 
extension and research, health, social welfare, and local infrastructure provision. 
However, the outcome has been mixed. On the plus side, local governments have more 
predictable and transparent financing than in the past, allowing them to pursue a range of 
innovative reforms, some of which have won international awards.8  However, there has 
been no comprehensive effort to assess local government performance, so the overall 
record is unknown. The generous revenue allotments have contributed to an 
unsustainably high national budget deficit, and possibly allowed many local authorities to 
avoid collecting local taxes (Diokno, 2003).  
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Systems work best when they are simple and transparent, and managed by competent 
officials and clear organizational arrangements. Many countries in the region have 
centralized, overly complex systems that often only exacerbate the corrupt practices they 
are intended to control. Government agencies with such procedures need to go through a 
lengthy process of securing funds, seeking competitive tenders, and awarding contracts. 
This lengthy process leads to different problems concerning, for example, procurement of 
ICT systems. To prevent undue influence of any one official, many decisions along the 
way are made by committees, which can lead to an unclear focus as compromises are 
made. In addition, a result of the lengthy process is that when acquisitions are made, the 
technology has often moved far beyond where it was when the project was first 
conceived. Thus, governments often install outdated systems. They also pay excessive 
prices, since new products may have come to the market during the long tender review 
that can deliver the same ICT power for much less money. The difference between the 
outdated tender price and the market price is also an arbitrage opportunity for corrupt 
officials (Wescott 2003: 110). 
A study (ADB, 2002b) of procurement practices in the Philippines allows one to estimate 
the exposure of ADB projects to potential losses from corruption. The prequalification 
stage is the most subjective, and therefore an area at great risk to corruption. Payments 
are made by bidders to be prequalified. Bidders also agree at this stage who will win the 












also collude with public officials to have competitors disqualified on false grounds. In the 
civil works area, foreign consultants reportedly pay 5-10 percent of the contract value to 
Table 2: Exposure to Graft of ADB-Financed Projects in the Philippines  
in Civil Works and Procurement of Goods 
 
 Percent of Project Cost 
Area Civil Works Supply of Goods 
Project Selection 0 0 
Bidding Stage   
 Prequalification 5 5 
 Evaluation, Negotiation, and 
Award 
5 0 
Conduct of Works and Delivery of Goods  
 Permits, Licenses, Approvals 10  5 
 Contract Administration 10 5 
Financial Management 0 0 
   
 Total 30 15 
Source: ADB 2002a 
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"buy" a contract. This increases the cost of the contract, and reduces quality by 
discouraging many qualified bidders. Contractors may also have to pay to expedite 
permits, licenses and approvals, certification for payment, contract revisions or 
variations, quarry royalties over and above those officially negotiated, to the consultants 
site staff for approval of work done, to expedite progress and escalation payments, to help 
agreement on the final measurement and to approve the final handover. Although specific 
payments can rarely be proven, the wide consensus that they do helps explain the low 
quality of work frequently observed. Table 2 provides estimates of exposure for ADB 
civil works projects and goods procurement. 
To address such problems, Mongolia instituted a Public Procurement Law in 2000. 
Bidders usually have 46 weeks to prepare bids, and evaluation and selection usually take 
another month. For domestically financed projects, the total process rarely lasts longer 
than 2 or 3 months. The results of major tenders are made public and unsuccessful 
bidders are informed of results. Most tender exercises to date have generated a good deal 
of interest and multiple bids, which one hopes is leading to price competitiveness (ADB, 
2004). 
Pay and employment 
Governments need a workforce of the right size and skills, which is motivated, honest, 
accountable, efficient, effective, and responsive. This is a challenge for developed 
countries, and more so for developing ones in Asia-Pacific. Internal accountability 
mechanisms may not be sufficient when officials collude with each other and with 
politicians, while outward accountability faces challenges of weak democratic traditions 
and systems. Public sectors are overstaffed and underpaid, thus limiting motivation and 
further encouraging graft. Personnel management systems are politicized and without a 
strong emphasis on merit or performance. Training is not well targeted, and often granted 
as a political favor rather than to build capacity. 
Despite these formidable challenges, some countries in the region are making headway. 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands reduced the unsustainable size of its civil service by 
30 percent with ADB support; however, because of other personnel issues remaining to 
be addressed, the quality of public services has declined (ADB, 2002b). The Federated 
States of Micronesia also reduced the size if its civil service by 22 percent during FY1997 
and 1998, and a 28 percent savings in wage bill costs (ADB, 2003c). This helped to 
reverse a situation of economic decline (-4.5 percent in 1997) to 6 percent growth in 
2000. Public services have weakened in some areas (education) but not in others (health). 
Improving performance 
While improving the performance of public services is a goal widely supported across 
many different stakeholders in the region, determining how to achieve it is not easy. 
There are many ways to improve performance, including use of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators, dialogue, report cards, peer pressure, incentives, and sanctions.  
Performance measures should be simple, and normally brought in without disrupting 
normal administrative and budgetary systems.  
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Take, for example, the road sector in Cambodia. Since the end of hostilities in the early 
1990s, Cambodia and its development partners have improved about 1/3 of primary and 
secondary roads to a point where they can be maintained, and about 2/5 of tertiary roads. 
Yet survey results indicate that while 40.7 percent of primary roads were in good or 
better condition in 2001, only 7.7 percent of secondary national roads were at this 
standard, and 6.5 percent of provincial and urban roads, because of poor maintenance. To 
improve this performance, development partners have recommended a unified planning 
and budgeting process, use of analytical tools in making inputs to the planning and 
budgeting process, greater transparency in investment and procurement decisions. While 
these recommendations make sense in principle, the reality on the ground is that many 
transport planning and strategy documents are prepared only in the local Khymer 
language, and thus not fully understood by donors. Before donors push Cambodia toward 
new administrative systems, they themselves need a better understanding of the local 
systems already in place, and their strengths and weaknesses (Tolentino 2004). 
An approach to productivity improvement being adopted in some regional countries is 
results-based management (RBM)9, which typically includes the following elements: i) a 
focus on desired results; (ii) indicators to measure progress made toward those results; 
(iii) the ability to use information on results to manage operations and resources to 
improve future performance; (iv) holding relevant staff accountable for results; (v) 
recruitment and promotion of staff based on merit; and (vi) staff awareness and 
ownership (ADB 2003a, p. 2). For example, since 1999, 49 agencies in Thailand have 
adopted RBM to improve performance (World Bank, 2003, p. 40.) Notions of improving 
performance by measuring results originated in the private sector. Yet both private and 
public organizations have found it difficult to adopt this approach (Ittner and Larker; de 
Bruijn).  
ADB has been facilitating education ministries in Cambodia and Mongolia to develop 
results oriented sector performance management capacity building plans. In Cambodia, a 
key aspect of results based monitoring has been the development of a joint annual sector 
review process, including the involvement of a recently formed NGO education 
partnership to formally participate in the process.  The annual review includes formation 
of joint ministry / donor / NGO working groups who jointly assess performance and 
make recommendations for improving sector results.  A follow-up Education Forum 
involves a range of stakeholders, including provincial governors and National Assembly 
officials. 
In Mongolia, the focus of ADB-supported, RBM development is the introduction of 
performance agreements at central, aimag and school levels. The objective of these 
agreements is to develop an inclusive process for results oriented planning, management 
and monitoring. The leadership of the process by the Minister and provincial governors is 
designed to ensure accountability to a range of stakeholders.  In particular, the school 
performance agreements directly involve communities and parents in annual target 
setting, development planning and monitoring, using the results of the years work, as a 
basis for revising school development plans.10 
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In a more developed example, the system of program agreements in Malaysia adopted 
starting in 1990 provides contracts between implementing agencies and the Treasury. 
Agency performance is evaluated at the end of each year against targets for output and 
impact; substandard performance necessitates preparation of an "exception report". 
Agencies are given flexibility to move spending within their budget ceiling. The system 
has some shortcomings: it doesn't set priorities among results achieved, it doesn't vary 
penalties depending on the extent to which the target is missed, and it doesn't cover non-
Treasury funded areas. Still, the system has reportedly improved efficiency and client 
satisfaction (Trivedi, 2004). 
However, such measures need to be used carefully. In the quest to achieve measurable 
results, there is a risk of quick fixes that arent sustainable, attaining measurable targets 
of questionable benefit (e.g. downsizing staff and rehiring the same staff as consultants), 
and setting up unreasonable expectations for change that cant be met (Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff).  There is also the risk that perception will diverge from reality.  
Laws and regulations enacted may not be enforced. Anti-corruption units may focus on 
eliminating political opponents. Policymakers may ventriloquize commitment to donor-
supported policy changes, giving the impression of local ownership of reforms; yet their 
actual views may be directly opposite. Expatriate advisors may be used not to train 
counterparts, but to carry out policy formulation and coordination roles, thus sidelining 
counterparts, who are seen by insecure rulers as potential threats if they know too much. 
Staff given specialized training may be transferred to assignments where the training is 
irrelevant for the same reason, thus perpetuating problems of low government 
effectiveness. Thus, one needs to be careful what results one measures, and what 
inferences are drawn (Wescott 2001a:`299). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing from ADBs experience since 1995 in the Asia-Pacific region, we have 
examined five conditions that are needed for administrative reforms to take hold: (i) 
leadership; (ii) vision; (iii) selectivity; (iv) sensitivity; and (v) stamina, with examples of 
each.  Improving public administration is one of the most difficult challenges facing 
governments and their development partners, because of the complexity of the processes, 
the wide variation in context, and the difficulties in measuring reform outputs and 
outcomes. The paper considers four broad lessons: (i) begin with diagnostic work; (ii) test 
for readiness; (iii) move at the right speed; and (iv) implement effectively. 
Building on the conditions and lessons outlined above, there are two operational 
approaches that have been successful in some countries: (i) assessing and strengthening 
capacity including inter-agency linkages; and (ii) empowering agents of change. With 
these conditions, lessons and approaches in mind, the paper reviews examples of two 
administrative reform priorities in the region: (i) strengthening government machinery 
and organization (e.g. central government organization, sub national government 
organization and decentralization, and other government bodies); and (ii) managing 
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public sector resources (e.g. central government, sub-national government, procurement, 
pay and employment, and improving performance). 
The public administration reform experiences in Asia-Pacific and other regions have 
improved our understanding of what works and what doesnt, what practices are 
transferable, and under what conditions. The successes and failures of reforms are better 
understood than in the past with the help of cross-border reform networks, international 
agencies, think tanks, consultants, the media, and scholars. However, genuine evaluation 
of reforms using rigorous social science techniques is rare. Reasons include the 
difficulties of proving cause-and-effect relationships because of problems of multiple 
attribution, lack of baseline data, lack of robust, experimental designs, lack of agreed 
conceptual frameworks and language for reform, methodological difficulties of 
comparing reform outcomes with counterfactuals, and the tradition of public management 
research focusing on prescription rather than explanation and analysis (Kelman et al., 
2003: 3-5; Jones and Kettl, 2003:12-14).  Fully cognizant of the methodological 
challenges, greater investment is needed in more rigorous research on how to achieve 
high performance by the public sector in Asia-Pacific. Such research would lead to better 
prescriptions, and a better return on the considerable investment in reform by 
governments and international agencies. 
Clay Wescott, Senior Policy Advisor, Asian Development Bank, Manila, The 
Philippines: cwescott@adb.org. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 This is a personal view, and not necessarily the view of the ADB. An earlier version         
was presented at the Conference on Regulation, De-Regulation and Re-Regulation in 
Globalizing Asia, National University of Singapore (NUS), March 2004 
2  Wolfensohn, 1996. This policy commitment to good governance by the World 
Banks President followed a series of analytical reports, including: World Bank, 1991, 
1992, 1994. 
3  For example, Washington Consensus, cf. Williamson, 2003; new public 
management, cf. Mathiasen, 1999; total quality management, cf. Sharma and Hoque; 
performance-based management, cf. vanHeldon and Johnson, 2002. 
4  This draws from conceptual work in Wescott, 1999. 
5  This section draws from Wescott and Porter (in press). 
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6  This categorization as defined by Rondinelli et al (1983: 13-31), Leonard and 
Marshall (1982: 27-37), and others, is the most widely accepted in the recent literature, 
although Cohen and Peterson (1999: 52-61) list a long array of alternative definitions 
7  Personal communication from Syahrul Luddin, ADB Jakarta. 
8  Mayor Jesse M. Robredo of Naga City won the Magsaysay award in 2000 "for his 
giving credence to the promise of democracy by demonstrating that effective city 
management is compatible with yielding power to the people". See 
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/FRAMES.HTML. 
9  See footnote 3 for some related approaches. 
10  Personal communication from Dr. Claudia Buentjen, ADB. 
11  web sites accessed March 2004. 
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